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The Confirmation Process and 
the Quality of Political Debate 
"-Jonathan L. Entin t 
Because so many important public issues have become the subject of 
constitutional litigation, the selection of Supreme Court justices has potentially 
significant political consequences. For most of the twentieth century, debate 
over prospective appointments focused upon seemingly neutral concepts of 
professional competence-knowledge of the law, intelligence, experience, 
integrity, and aspects of character embodied in the notion of judicial tempera-
ment-rather than upon candidates' substantive views. 1 Recently, however, 
the debate has changed dramatically, and consideration of prospective justices' 
personal philosophy has dominated the confirmation process.2 The former 
approach might be called the competence model, the latter the ideological 
model. 3 
Those who favor full discussion of major political issues might be expected 
to approve the emergence of the ideological model. After all, this approach 
emphasizes substantive constitutional visions and focuses directly upon subjects 
that lie at the heart of national debate. Besides, it is more honest than the 
competence model, which has often concealed substantive disagreements 
beneath layers of symbolic arguments about ethics and character. 4 In fact, the 
t Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. Charles Cole, Melvyn Durchslag, Erik Jensen, 
Ronald Kahn, Harold Krent, Karen Nelson Moore, and Richard Myers offered helpful comments on earlier 
drafts. 
1. See, e.g., HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS 4 (3d ed. 1992); JOEL B. GROSSMAN, 
LAWYERS AND JUDGES 50-51, 106-08, 199 (1965); Felix Frankfurter, The Supreme Coun in the Mirror 
of Justices, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 793-94, 796 (1957). For a critique of this approach, see Stephen 
L. Carter, The Confinnation Mess, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1185, I 185-88 (1988). 
2. To be sure, some justices earlier in this century faced opposition explicitly premised upon 
ideological disagreement. Among them Were Justices Stone, Hughes, Black, Stewart, and Marshall. All 
were confirmed at least in part because most senators were unwilling to vote against a nominee solely for 
reasons of philosophical difference. See ABRAHAM, supra note I, at 196-97, 201, 214, 272-73, 293-94; 
JOSEPH P. HARRJS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 117-19, 124-27, 305-09 (1953); LAURENCE 
H. TRIBE, Goo SAVE TillS HONORABLE COURT 89 (1985). Judge John Parker was defeated largely 
(although not exclusively) for ideological reasons in 1930, see infra note 42 and accompanying text, but 
he was the sole exception to the generalization stated above during the first two-thirds of the twentieth 
century. 
3. These terms are my own, but they capture the two principal approaches to the confirmation process 
that have been taken in the extensive literature on the subject. See supra notes 1-2; irifra note 5. 
4. The Brandeis controversy is a notable example. His opponents objected to his progressive legal 
views but criticized him for alleged character flaws and professional improprieties. For a comprehensive 
account of the confirmation process, see A.L. TODD, JUSTICE ON TRIAL (1964). For a detailed analysis 
of the ethical criticisms, see John P. Frank, The Legal Erlzics of Louis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REV. 683 
(1965). 
Similarly, Justice Black's selection was criticized by opponents of the New Deal on the basis of his 
alleged Jack of judicial temperament rather than because he had been a staunch supporter of President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt's legislative program. ABRAHAM, supra note I, at 213-14; HARRIS, supra note 2, 
at 306-08. Justice Clark's nomination was assailed as a blatant example of political cronyism by those who 
disagreed with his views about loyalty and security programs at the beginning of the Cold War. ABRAHAM, 
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emergence of the ideological model, most notably in the pitched battles over 
the nominations of Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas, has left virtually 
everyone dissatisfied with intensely confrontational debates that generate more 
heat than light. 5 
This Article examines the seeming contradiction between the rise of the 
ideological model and the increasing public revulsion against the degrading 
spectacle that the confirmation process all too often has become. The principal 
problem with recent confirmation debates has been the exaggeration of the 
stakes of argument. Participants have focused so single-mindedly on winning 
the immediate battle that they have lost sight of the limited impact that any 
individual justice can have on American law and society. I suggest that the 
kind of political discourse which can promote effective government has both 
normative and empirical components. The normative aspect involves values, 
goals, and visions. The empirical aspect requires an assessment of how the 
resolution of a particular issue will shape the immediate and distant future and 
an evaluation of the costs as well as the benefits of making particular argu-
ments. 
Because open debate is a core value in the United States, the conclusions 
drawn from this discussion might have broader significance for those who seek 
to elevate civic discourse. Indeed, Justice Brandeis viewed "public discussion 
[a]s a political duty, "6 and one of the principal theories of the First Amend-
supra note 1, at 246-47; HARRIS, supra note 2, at 311-12. 
5. Unhappiness over the Bork proceedings, in which the nominee was subjected to five days of 
intensive questioning about his passionate condemnation of much of the previous half-century's constitution-
al jurisprudence, stimulated extensive commentary about the Senate's role in the confirmation process. See, 
e.g., Essays on the Supreme Court Appointment Process, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1146 (1988); William G. 
Ross, The Functions, Roles, and Duties of the Senate in the Supreme Court Appointment Process, 28 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 633 (1987); Gary J. Simson, Taking the Court Seriously: A Proposed Approach to Senate 
Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominees, 7 CONST. COMMENTARY 283 (1990); David A. Strauss & Cass 
R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmarion Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491 (1992); 
Symposium, Corifinnation Controversy: The Selection of a Supreme Court Justice, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 
832 (1990). Resolution of that issue is beyond the scope of this article. 
Much of the dissatisfaction over the Thomas confirmation process stems from the extraordinary 
hearings on Professor Anita Hill's sexual harassment allegations. Those who believed Professor Hill were 
outraged that the Senate Judiciary Committee seemed not to take her charges seriously until they were 
disclosed by the press. Moreover, they were further enraged by the Senate's treatment of Professor Hill 
when she testified in public session. See, e.g., Nell Irvin Painter, Who Was Lynched?, 253 NATION 577 
(1991); Priscilla Painton, Supreme Court: Woman Power, TIME, Oct. 28, 1991, at 24; Anna Quindlen, 
The Peifect Victim, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1991, atA25; Maralee Schwartz, Feminists Vow to Seek Political 
Changes, WASH. PosT, Oct. 17, 1991, at A7. Those who rejected her claims were incensed that the 
nominee had been subjected to scurrilous attack. See, e.g., Barbara Arnie!, Guest Editorial: Feminist 
Harassmem, NAT'L REV., Nov. 4, 1991, at 14; Abigail Thernstrom, Rough Justice: The Plot That Failed, 
NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. II, 1991, at 14; Juan Williams, Open Season on Clarence Thomas, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 10, 1991, at A23. Even before the sexual harassment issue arose, however, the debate over the 
Thomas nomination was intensely adversarial. The first round of Senate hearings was devoted primarily 
to a meticulous exegesis of his speeches and writings at the behest of those who feared that he would vote 
to overrule Roe v. Wade, curtail affirmative action, and write a wide array of "New Right" notions-into 
the Constitution. 
6. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
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ment emphasizes the value of free speech for promoting self-government. 7 Our 
system of self-government rests upon a conception of deliberative politics that 
stresses fair consideration of rival positions. 8 Yet there is widespread unhappi-
.. ness with the overall quality of contemporary political debate in this country. 
Too much of that debate is regarded as stirring up resentments rather than 
promoting solutions/ and this in turn is said to have alienated many Ameri-
cans from the political process. 10 In short, we need to focus upon the content 
of political debate in order to understand how to enhance the quality of that 
debate. 11 
The analysis proceeds as follows. Part I traces the modern emergence of 
the ideological model to the rejection by the Senate of President Nixon's 
nomination of Judge Clement Haynsworth in 1969. This discussion demon-
strates that the Haynsworth debate focused initially upon allegations of ethical 
impropriety that masked important substantive differences, but soon developed 
into a more explicit argument over constitutional philosophy, particularly in 
the area of civil rights. Part II appraises the extent to which the rejections of 
Haynsworth and Bork affected doctrinal developments that gave rise to those 
confirmation controversies, and assesses the effects of those disputes upon the 
quality of political discourse. Part III seeks to relate the stakes of the normative 
argument to the tone of confirmation debates and considers other functions that 
might be served by ideologically based opposition to prospective justices. Part 
IV concludes by attempting to derive some broader lessons for those who seek 
to promote a more deliberative politics in the United States. 
I. THE HAYNSWORTH NOMINATION AND THE IDEOLOGICAL MODEL 
The competence model began to lose its dominance over the confirmation 
process a quarter-century ago in the debate over President Nixon's failed nomi-
nation of Clement Haynsworth. The competence model framed that debate for 
a time as his opponents emphasized alleged ethical lapses, but the critics also 
attacked Haynsworth's substantive views in what were, for the time, unusually 
explicit terms. Some of the same issues (and some of the same actors) animat-
7. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948). 
There are other theories of the First Amendment, but none contests the importance of protecting political 
speech. See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LffiERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989); THOMAS I. 
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970); MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRES-
SION; A CRITICAL ANALYSIS (1984). 
8. See, e.g., JAMES S. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELffiERATION 35-41 (1991); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 133-41, 232-56 (1993). 
9. See, e.g., KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, DIRTY POLITICS (1992). 
10. See, e.g., E.J. DIONNE, JR., WHY AMERICANS HATE POLITICS (1991); JAMIESON, supra note 9. 
11. Cf DIONNE, supra note 10, at 15 (arguing that "we have tended ... to focus too narrowly on 
the political process and not enough on the contem of politics"). 
409 
Yale Law & Policy Review Vol. 11:407, 1993 
ed more recent confirmation debates in which the ideological model held sway. 
President Nixon nominated Haynsworth, Chief Judge of the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, to replace Justice Abe Fortas, who had 
resigned under fire over allegations of ethical improprieties. 12 A moderately 
conservative South Carolinian with apparently impeccable academic and 
professional credentials, 13 Haynsworth soon incurred the wrath of liberals 
who saw him as hostile to organized labor and civil rights. This posed a 
dilemma for many senators who saw the nominee as technically fit but substan-
tively wrong on important issues. The dominance of the competence model 
meant that those who disagreed with a candidate's views generally couched 
their opposition in other terms. 
Because philosophical disagreement was widely viewed as an inappropriate 
basis for rejecting a prospective justice, the Senate opposition focused primari-
ly-although, as will be seen, not exclusively-upon Haynsworth' sown alleged 
ethicallapses. 14 By defining the issue this way, the critics were able to chal-
lenge Haynsworth on the same grounds that others had attacked Fortas. More 
important, this strategy gave those who were reluctant to resist a Court nomi-
nee on ideological grounds a more acceptable justification for voting against 
confirmation. 15 
The ethical questions concerned Haynsworth's participation in two cases 
in which he was alleged to have had a conflict of interest. In the first case, 
12. Fortas was forced off the Court in May 1969 following a less than forthright response to reports 
that he had an improper relationship with Louis Wolfson. That relationship included a lucrative financial 
arrangement with a Wolfson-sponsored foundation and claims that the Justice had offered to intervene with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission to sidetrack an investigation into Wolfson's business affairs. With 
the Nixon Administration hinting that the Justice might have committed a federal crime, Fortas resigned 
within days of the news reports. JOHN P. FRANK, CLEMENT HAYNSWORTH, THE SENATE, AND THE 
SUPREME COURT 6-12 (1991); LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORT AS 359-78 (1990); BRUCE A. MURPHY, FORT AS: 
THE RISE AND RUIN OF A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 545-77 (1988); ROBERT SHOGAN, A QUESTION OF 
JUDGMENT 185-261 (1972). 
This was not the first time that Fortas's judicial ethics had been questioned. In the Spring of 1968, 
President Johnson nominated him to succeed retiring Chief Justice Earl Warren. Senate Republicans, sensing 
victory in the presidential election and hoping to give their candidate the chance to fill this important 
position, prevented a vote on the Fortas nomination. To make their position appear more respectable, the 
opponents alleged that Fortas had committed various ethical improprieties, specifically that he continued 
to advise Johnson on policy matters after ascending to the bench and that he accepted an unusually large 
fee for a series of university lectures. FRANK, supra, at 5-6; KALMAN, supra, at 327-58; MURPHY, supra, 
at 269-526; SHOGAN, supra, at 143-84. 
13. Haynsworth graduated summa cum laude from Furman University and received his law degree 
from Harvard, where he ranked 51st in a class of 399 students. He went on to a distinguished career in 
a prominent South Carolina law firm; he served in naval intelligence during World War II and worked 
briefly in government during the Korean War. FRANK, supra note 12, at 17-18. 
14. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 15. To avoid undercutting the ethics issue, the opponents chose not 
to ask Senator Edward Kennedy, who was suspected of covering up his involvement in a recent automobile 
accident in which one of his female staff members was killed, to take the lead against Haynsworth. See 
FRANK, supra note 12, at 30. 
15. See FRANK, supra note 12, at 134. 
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Darlington Manufacturing Co. v. NLRB, 16 he cast the deciding vote in favor 
of an employer accused of unfair labor practices; the Supreme Court unani-
mously reversed that decision~ At the time, Haynsworth was a shareholder in 
a company that operated vending machines in three other plants owned by 
Darlington's parent corporationY The other case, Brunswick Corp. v. 
Long, 18 involved a corporation in which Haynsworth had acquired $16,000 
worth of stock during the pendency of an appeal on which he sat. 19 
Behind these arguments, however, were fundamental differences of princi-
ple about the future direction of the Supreme Court. In fact, the validity of the 
ethical complaints was never entirely clear.20 Haynsworth was opposed by 
those who viewed him as a clone of his fellow South Carolinian Strom Thur-
mond, the Senate's most notorious segregationist. 21 President Nixon had a 
well-publicized southern strategy, and Senator Thurmond was one of his 
strongest supporters, so the Haynsworth nomination was viewed as part of a 
political bargain with the South's most regressive elements. 22 
16. 325 F.2d 682 (4th Cir. 1963) (en bane), rev'd sub nom. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. 
Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965). 
17. See FRANK, supra note 12, at 21-22. 
18. 392 F.2d 337 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 966 (1968). 
19. FRANK, supra note 12, at 45, 53; see infra note 20. 
20. These allegations have been dismissed by one leading commentator as "pure makeweight" and 
"utter[ly] unjustifiab[le]." FRANK, supra note 12, at 2, 121, 134. The vending-machine company in which 
Haynsworth owned stock was not a party to the DarlingTOn litigation and would not have been directly 
affected by the outcome of that case. Accordingly, Haynsworth had no reason to recuse himself and had 
an affirmative duty to sit. I d. at 42. Brunswick was a party, but Haynsworth 's holdings were not great 
enough to require recusal under the judicial disqualification statute then in effect. See id. at 54. The Judicial 
Code of 1948 required a federal judge to refrain from participating in "any case in which he has a 
substantial interest." Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869, 908. 
Haynsworth himself declined to make this statutory argument. Instead, he characterized the purchase 
of the Brunswick stock as an oversight. He had been a member of the panel that heard Brunswick. The 
panel agreed on its decision that day; another judge was assigned to write the opinion. Six weeks later, 
Haynsworth accepted his broker's recommendation to purchase some Brunswick stock without recalling 
that he had sat in a case involving that company. He explained that if he had remembered the case, he 
would not have bought the stock. FRANK, supra note 12, at 53-54. 
The judicial disqualification statute was extensively rewritten in response to the Haynsworth controver-
sy. The new version eliminated the "substantial interest" provision and required recusal whenever a judge 
owned any financial interest, "however small," in a party to a pending case. Act of Dec. 5, 1974, Pub. 
L. No. 93-512, § I, 88 Stat. 1609 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4), (d)(4) (1988)). Even under the 
amended disqualification statute, Judge Haynsworth would have been allowed to sit in Darlington. FRANK, 
supra note 12, at 131-33. 
21. FRANK, supra note 12, at 59. Thurmond had been the Dixiecrat presidential candidate in 1948, 
NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE 32-36 (1969); ALEXANDER P. LAMIS, THE Two-
PARTY SoUTH 9 (expanded ed. 1988), and held the floor for more than 24 hours in a last-gasp filibuster 
against the Civil Rights Act of 1957. See generally NADINE COHODAS, STROM THURMOND AND THE 
POLITICS OF SOUTHERN CHANGE 174-92, 294-97 (1993). He had helped to sponsor Haynsworth's 
appointment to the Fourth Circuit in 1957. JACK W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN 24 (1961). 
Thurmond deliberately played an inconspicuous role in the confirmation fight to avoid harming Hayns-
worth's chances. FRANK, supra note 12, at 74. 
22. FRANK, supra note 12, at 66 (noting the "widespread suspicion that the appointment was the 
product of a deal between the President and Senator Thurmond"). On Nixon's southern strategy, see 
STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, NIXON: THE TRIUMPH OF A POLITICIAN 1962-1972, at 330-31 (1989). The selection 
of a Supreme Court justice from that region was part of his political plan. FRANK, supra note 12, at 29, 
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While the public attacks on Haynsworth initially centered on ethical 
improprieties, the real source of the Haynsworth controversy was his perceived 
hostility to labor unions and civil rights. The AFL-CIO made the defeat of 
Haynsworth one of its major priorities. 23 The labor federation cited seven 
cases in which he had sided with management and been reversed by the 
Supreme Court; six of the reversals had been unanimous. 24 One of those cases 
was Darlington, in which Haynsworth cast the deciding vote. 25 Another was 
NLRB v. S. S. Logan Packing Co., 26 in which Haynsworth wrote the lower 
court opinion. Both cases involved employer misconduct in opposing efforts 
to organize unions in a region where labor forces had long been weak. 
Haynsworth also had written some opinions that were unsympathetic to 
civil rights. For example, in Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospita/, 21 
he dissented from a ruling which prohibited private hospitals that received 
federal funds from refusing to serve African-Americans. Haynsworth contend-
ed that the receipt of such funds was not sufficient to transform the hospitals' 
segregation into state action for constitutional purposes. 28 To his opponents, 
this error was compounded by his grudging acceptance of Simkins in a later 
case in which he pointedly stated that he was "unpersuaded" that his earlier 
view was "incorrect. "29 
Haynsworth 's most troublesome opinion was probably Griffin v. Board of 
Supervisors/0 which appeared to countenance defiance of a school desegrega-
tion order. The local authorities in Prince Edward County, Virginia, closed 
their public schools to prevent integration. Haynsworth ruled that the federal 
courts should abstain from deciding the constitutionality of the school closing 
until the state courts had ruled. This was not just any desegregation case: 
Prince Edward County was one of the defendants in Brown v. Board of 
Education. 31 Eliminating public schools was part of the state's campaign of 
133. Nixon had made the liberal bent of the Supreme Court an important issue in the 1968 presidential 
campaign. AMBROSE, supra, at 154, 159, 658. He supported desegregation but opposed aggressive efforts 
to promote integration. ld. at 187, 316-17. 
23. FRANK, supra note 12, at 30, 31. 
24. !d. at 19-20, 56. Only one justice dissented in the seventh case. ld. at 32. 
25. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. 
26. 386 F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1967), rev'd sub nom. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). 
27. 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963) (en bane), cen. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964). 
28. !d. at 971-77 (Haynsworth, J., dissenting). 
29. Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710, 715 (4th Cir. 1964) (Haynsworth, J., concurring specially). Later 
cases indicate that Haynsworth was not a zealot on this issue. In Doe v. Charleston Area Medical Ctr., 
Inc., 529 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1975), he refrained from reasserting the state action position he had defended 
in Simkins and which other courts had accepted in analogous circumstances. See infra note 37. 
30. 322 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1963), rev'd sub nom. Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
31. 347 U.S. 483 (1954), rev'g Davis v. County Sch:Bd., 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952) (three-
judge court). For discussion of the events leading to the filing of this lawsuit, see RICHARD KLUGER, 
SIMPLE JUSTICE 451-79 (1976); BOB SMITH, THEY CLOSED THEIR SCHOOLS 3-79 (1965). 
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Massive Resistance to Brown. 32 Local authorities supported the creation of 
private schools for white students, while African-American children went 
without formal education of any kind for four years. 33 Civil rights advocates 
were outraged that Haynsworth had been prepared to subject these children 
to the tender mercies of segregationist officials and institutions. 34 The Su-
preme Court unanimously reversed his ruling, and the public schools reopened 
on a nominally desegregated basis in 1964.35 
Although many disagreed with Haynsworth's views in these cases, they did 
not question his professional competence, which was the traditional standard 
for evaluating judicial nominees. No one at first believed that Haynsworth's 
labor law jurisprudence could keep him off the Court; even in their most 
optimistic initial projections, AFL-CIO officials anticipated no more than two 
dozen votes against confirmation on this ground. 36 
The same was probably true about his approach towards civil rights. There 
were respectable, though ultimately unpersuasive, legal arguments for his 
cautious positions. 37 The opposition conceded that Haynsworth was no judicial 
Massive Resister. Lewis Powell called him "a Southern moderate. "38 The 
32. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CRISIS OF CONSERVATNE VIRGINIA 30-89 (1976); BENJAMIN MUSE, 
VIRGINJA'S MASSNE RESISTANCE 15-139 (1961). 
33. SMITH, supra note 31, at 87-235. The federal government, with the cooperation of state officials, 
arranged for private financing of a system of "free schools" that operated during the fifth year of the public 
school closing. /d. at 236-59. 
34. FRANK, supra note 12, at 20, 58-59. 
35. Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964). For contrasting accounts of the situation in 
Prince Edward County since the public schools reopened, compare RAYMOND WOLTERS, THE BURDEN 
OF BROWN 116-25 (1984) (emphasizing continuing racial conflict) with Jonathan L. Entin, Defeasible Fees, 
State Action, w1d the Legacy of Massive Resistance, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 769, 774-75 (1993) (noting 
the return of most wliite children to public schools and the desegregation of a private academy established 
during Massive Resistance). 
36. FRANK, supra note 12, at 30. Haynsworth was not reflexively anti-labor. He had sided with unions 
in 37 cases. /d. at 56. 
37. The precise question in Simkins was mooted by the passage of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 252-53 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7 
(1988)), which prohibited racial discrimination in federally funded programs. The more general question, 
whether receipt of public funding makes a nominally private beneficiary a state actor for constitutional 
purposes, has continued to divide the courts. See, e.g., Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 424 U.S. 948, 949 
(1976) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (collecting cases); Grieco v. Orange Memorial Hosp. 
Corp., 423 U.S. 1000, 1004-05 (1975) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (collecting additional 
cases). The Fourth Circuit has adhered to Simkins in the broader context. Doe v. Charleston Area Medical 
Ctr., Inc., 529 F.2d 638, 642 (4th Cir. 1975). Judge Haynsworth was a member of the panel in Doe and 
subscribed to the opinion without mentioning his earlier reservations. 
The argument for abstention in Griffin also was not frivolous. See, e.g., Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman 
Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498 (1941). The Virginia Supreme Court had effectively ended Massive Resistance 
at the state level by invalidating the legislative centerpiece of the die-hard segregationists. Harrison v. Day, 
106 S.E.2d 636 (Va. 1959). At the same time, it seemed unlikely that the state courts would act promptly 
in the Prince Edward case. Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 322 F.2d 332, 345 n.l (4th Cir. 1963) (Bell, 
J., dissenting) (emphasizing state supreme court's refusal to expedite proceedings), rev'd sub nom. Griffin 
v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
38. FRANK, supra note 12, at 92. Haynsworth had sided with civil rights claimants in at least a dozen 
lower-profile cases, but they carried less weight with his critics than did Simkins and Griffin. /d. at 20, 
59. 
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iabel was intended as a compliment, but it had distinctly negative connotations 
for civil rights advocates who regarded Haynsworth as too willing to tolerate 
delay and evasion in desegregation cases.39 Haynsworth was, in short, too 
much like John Parker, his mentor and predecessor as Chief Judge of the 
Fourth Circuit, whose cramped reading of Brown had contributed to the snail's 
pace of school desegregation during the decade after that decision. 40 
Nevertheless, the Senate refused to confirm Haynsworth, the first rejection 
of a Supreme Court nominee since 1930. Ironically, the defeated nominee then 
was Parker, whose appointment drew the ire of a similar coalition of labor and 
civil rights advocates. 41 The real problem for Haynsworth was that mere 
professional competence was no longer sufficient for confirmation. 
President Nixon responded by nominating Judge Harrold Carswell of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, a move that has been character-
ized as "a bad legal joke. "42 There were no diversionary arguments about 
ethics. The nominee was widely regarded as incompetent. 43 Several of his 
39. !d. at 59. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., in a statement written four months before Haynsworth 
issued his abstention decision in Griffin, explained why moderation on civil rights was inappropriate: 
[O]ver the past few years I have been gravely disappointed with the white moderate. I have 
almost reached the regrettable conclusion that the Negro's great stumbling block in his stride 
toward freedom is not the White Citizen's Counciler or the Ku Klux Klanner, but the white 
moderate, who is more devoted to "order" than to justice; who prefers a negative peace which 
is the absence of tension to a positive peace which is the presence of justice; who constantly says: 
"I agree with you in the goal you seek, but I cannot agree with your methods of direct action"; 
who paternalistically believes he can set the timetable for another man's freedom; who lives by 
a mythical concept of time and who constantly advises the Negro to wait for "a more convenient 
season." Shallow understanding from people of good will is more frustrating ·than absolute 
misunderstanding from people of ill will. 
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Lerrer From Birmingham Jail, in WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 76, 84-85 (1964) 
(written April 16, 1963); see also Calvin Trillin, Reflections: Remembrance of Moderates Past, NEW 
YoRKER, Mar. 21, 1977, at 85 (discussing various conceptions of "moderation" in the decade after Brown 
and noting that Attorney General Griffin Bell, who had written Georgia's anti-integration laws while serving 
as counsel to the Governor of Georgia, was characterized as a moderate at his confirmation hearing two 
decades later because his proposals to forestall desegregation were less extreme than those in Virginia). 
40. On remand from the Supreme Court, Parker had written: "The Constitution ... does not require 
integration. It merely forbids discrimination. It does not forbid such segregation as occurs as the result of 
voluntary action. It merely forbids the use of governmental power to enforce segregation." Briggs v. Elliott, 
132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955) (three-judge court). Many opponents of Brown seized upon this 
language to justify their position. PELTASON, supra note 21, at 22-23. On the personal relationship between 
Haynsworth and Parker, see FRANK, supra note 12, at 18, 128. 
41. See supra note 2. See generally KENNETH W. GOINGS, "THE NAACP COMES OF AGE": THE 
DEFEAT OF JUDGE JOHN J. PARKER (1990); HARRIS, supra note 2, at 127-32; KLUGER, supra note 31, 
at 141-44; Joel B. Grossman & Stephen Wasby, Haynswonh and Parker: History Does Live Again, 23 
S.C. L. REV. 345 (1971). 
42. FRANK, supra note 12, at 135. Astonishingly, Carswell had been strongly recommended by former 
Attorney General William Rogers, who was then serving as Secretary of State, and Chief Justice Burger. 
ld. at 100. 
43. Id. at 135 (characterizing Carswell as "demonstrably incompetent"); id. at 103. ("one of the 
poorest" federal judges in the South). In addition to an unusually high reversal rate, id. at Ill; RICHARD 
HARRIS, DECISION 162-63 (1971), Carswell had a notably retrograde civil rights record. Before going on 
the bench, he had helped to draft the papers that converted a public golf club into a private one in order 
to allow its continued operation on a segregated basis. Carswell denied any role in that affair during his 
confirmation hearing, but the Senate Judiciary Committee had documentary evidence of his involvement 
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Fifth Circuit colleagues refused to endorse him,44 and one of Carswell's 
staunchest senatorial supporters conceded his mediocrity in a statement that 
effectively assured his defeat. 45 Not surprisingly, the Senate rejected Cars-
well, but by a narrower margin than it had defeated Haynsworth.46 
At that point, President Nixon abandoned his quest to appoint a Southerner. 
Instead, he chose Judge Harry Blackmun of the Eighth Circuit, who had 
committed the same alleged ethical breach that caused Haynsworth so much 
difficulty. If anything, Blackmun's conduct was worse: he had sat in four cases 
in which his stock holdings arguably created a conflict of interest. 47 Neverthe-
less, Blackmun was unanimously confirmed. 48 
The Haynsworth and Carswell affairs foreshadowed recent confrrmation 
fights. Haynsworth and Carswell, like Bork and Thomas, were chosen by a 
chief executive who sought to change the direction of the Supreme Court while 
facing a Senate controlled by the opposing political party during a period of 
deep interbranch distrust. 49 Perhaps for that reason, the debate over these 
earlier nominees marked an important turning point by legitimizing explicitly 
and he had been shown that evidence the night before he testified. FRANK, supra note 12, at 105-06. This 
was not the only evidence of Carswell's racial attitudes. As a candidate for the Georgia legislature, Carswell 
also had strongly advocated white supremacy. /d. at 102-03. As a district judge, he had frequently abused 
civil rights lawyers and refused to follow binding precedent. /d. at 104, 107-09; HARRIS, supra, at 38-39, 
50-54. 
44. HARRIS, supra note 43, at 139; see also id. at 44-45, 110, 139-40; FRANK, supra note 12, at 106-
07, 112. 
45. Senator Roman Hruska defended Carswell against claims that he lacked professional distinction 
by explaining that "there are a lot of mediocre judges and people and lawyers. They are entitled to a little 
representation, aren't they, and a little chance? We can't have all Brandeises and Frankfurters and Cardozos 
and stuff like that there." FRANK, supra note 12, at 112; HARRIS, supra note 43, at 110. The remark was 
an "admittedly feeble-and ill-advised-attempt at a quip," Roman L. Hruska, Letter to the Editor, WALL 
ST. 1., Sept. 12, 1988, at 15, but the humor was lost in the heat of debate. Whatever Hruska's intent, at 
least one other senator cited Carswell's modest intellect as a valid basis for confirmation. ABRAHAM, supra 
note 1, at 17. 
46. The vote against Carswell was 45-51; Haynsworth lost by 45-55. FRANK, supra note 12, at 88, 
116. The closeness of the Carswell vote suggests that he might have been confirmed had President Nixon 
pursued a sounder strategy with undecided senators. For discussion of some of Nixon's dubious tactics on 
Carswell's behalf, see JOHN MASSARO, SUPREMELY POLITICAL 116-33 (1990). 
47. FRANK, supra note 12, at 120. Blackmun was a member of the panel in two cases involving a 
party in which he owned stock. Kotula v. Ford Motor Co., 338 F.2d 732 (8th Cir. 1964); Hanson v. Ford 
Motor Co., 278 F.2d 586 (8th Cir. 1960). He owned shares in a party's parent corporation in a third case. 
Mahoney v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 377 F.2d 549 (8th Cir. 1967). In the fourth, he participated in 
a vote denying rehearing en bane after purchasing stock in one of the parties. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. 
Co. v. Superior Insulating Tape Co., 284 F.2d 478 (8th Cir. 1960). For more detailed discussion of these 
matters, see Nomination of Harry A. Blackmun of Minnesota to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Coun 
of the United States: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1970) 
(letter from Deputy Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst to Sen. James 0. Eastland); id. at 45-48 
(testimony of Harry A. Blackmun); S. EXEc. REP. No. 18, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970). 
48. FRANK, supra note 12, at 124. 
49. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1164, 1170 (1988). 
Bork attributed his defeat in part to the Republicans' loss of control of the Senate the year before his 
nomination. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 345 (1990). 
Divided control of the White House and Senate is not a necessary condition for confirmation conflicts, 
however. The Democrats controlled both branches when Fortas's nomination to succeed Warren as chief 
justice failed. DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN I97 n.60 (1991). 
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ideological considerations in the confirmation process. By the time of the Bork 
and Thomas nominations, issues such as ethics and character had almost 
completely disappeared in favor of ideological arguments. 50 Many of those 
arguments began from the premise that defeating a nominee would have a 
substantial impact upon the development of the law. Perhaps for that reason, 
the tone of those debates turned increasingly nasty. 
II. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL IMPACT OF IDEOLOGICAL BATTLES 
As was noted in the introduction, the ideological model might be viewed 
as promoting deliberative politics by focusing attention upon substantive 
constitutional issues of greatest concern to the people. This view assumes that 
defeating a nominee on ideological grounds makes a difference, either by 
leading directly to the appointment of a justice whom opponents regard as 
ideologically more palatable, or by furthering other goals, such as public 
education or political mobilization, that promote the critics' ideals and visions. 
This Section considers whether the defeat of Haynsworth and Bork has really 
affected the development of the law. The next considers how the recent 
ideological campaigns might have served other functions. 
Two preliminary observations are important. First, determining what might 
have been is a notoriously difficult undertaking. 51 What follows is hardly a 
systematic analysis but rather a selective comparison between the actual and 
the counterfactual. Second, the appointment of a justice whom opponents 
regard as more palatable need not necessarily lead to different outcomes in 
particular cases. The Supreme Court changes one member at a time. Each 
justice influences the Court's decisions, but the impact of those individual 
contributions is affected by many, often fortuitous, factors. For purposes of 
assessing judicial impact, therefore, ideological opposition can be deemed 
successful if it results in the appointment of an alternative candidate who 
moves the Court's center of gravity in the desired direction, even if the 
appointment does not immediately affect case results. 
50. At the beginning of the Thomas confirmation process, before the more notorious charges of sexual 
harassment arose, there was a minor ethical flap. Critics claimed that Thomas should have recused himself 
from one case in which he wrote the opinion, ALPO Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958 
(D.C. Cir. 1990), because his mentor and chief political sponsor, Senator John Danforth, owned several 
million dollars' worth of stock in one of the parties. See Monroe Freedman, Thomas' Ethics and the Coun: 
Nominee 'Urrfit to Sit' For Failing to Recuse in Ralston Purina Case, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 26, 1991, at 
20. This issue played almost no role in the confirmation debate. 
51. See generally Robert N. Strassfeld, If . .. : Counterfactuals in the Law, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
339, 372-92 (1992). 
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A. After Haynsworth 
Defeating Haynsworth was only half the battle for his opponents. There 
remained the question of whom Presjdent Nixon would nominate in his stead. 
The selection of the inept and malevolent Carswell, who came closer to 
confirmation than did Haynsworth, illustrates the risks inherent in opposing 
a prospective justice on ideological grounds. 
Even Blackmun, who ultimately was approved, held a less-than-ideal civil 
rights record on the Eighth Circuit. Most notably, the Supreme Court reversed 
his decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 52 an important housing discrim-
ination case. Blackmun held that the Reconstruction statute on which the claim 
rested did not apply to purely private behavior. This ruling, had it been 
allowed to stand, might have had a broader impact than any of Haynsworth's 
controversial decisions. While Haynsworth's opinion in Griffin had enormous 
symbolic significance, it was clear at the time that Prince Edward County 
represented the last gasp of Massive Resistance, rather than a threat to the 
future of public education in the former Confederacy. 53 Blackmun' s opinion 
in Jones v. Mayer, by contrast, would have substantially limited legal protec-
tion for some victims of housing discrimination. 54 
Nor was this the only time that Blackmun had rejected an important civil 
rights claim. 55 He also wrote an opinion upholding a death sentence against 
an Arkansas African-American man who had been convicted of raping a white 
woman. 56 In symbolic terms, this case should have resonated at least as 
strongly as Haynsworth's ruling in Griffin, because it implicated the primordial 
racist canard about the African-American male's supposedly uncontrollable lust 
52. 379 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 392 U.S. 409 (1968). See FRANK, supra note 12, at 121. 
53. BARTLEY, supra note 21, at 320-45; SMITH, supra note 31, at 261-62. · 
54. With the benefit of hindsight, we know that Blackmun's ruling in Jones v. Mayer also would have 
left many victims of other forms of racial discrimination without recourse. Several later cases held that 
a related Reconstruction statute prohibited private as well as governmental racial discrimination in the 
making and enforcement of contracts. The most notable of these was Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 
(1976). The majority opinion relied heavily upon Jones v. Mayer and almost certainly would have come 
out differently had Blackmun's ruling prevailed. /d. at 168-75, 179. Two justices made clear that they 
would have reached a different result if Jones v. Mayer had been decided the other way. ld. at 186 (Powell, 
1., concurring); id. at 189-90 (Stevens, J., concurring). The lower court decision in Rllllyon, which the 
Supreme Court affirmed, had been written by Haynsworth. See infra note 85 and accompanying text. 
55. Jones v. Mayer might have been overlooked because Congress passed another fair housing law 
while that case was pending in the Supreme Court. Civil Rights Act of 1968, tit. Vlll, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 
82 Stat. 73, 81-89 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988)). Another possible reason for 
the lack of controversy over this decision was that Blackmun virtually apologized for reaching his 
conclusion, which he saw as dictated by unfavorable but still binding precedents, and almost invited the 
Supreme Court to reverse. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 379 F.2d at 44-46. 
56. Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968), vacated and remanded, 398 U.S. 262 (1970). 
The defendant advanced a statistically based claim of racial disparities in the imposition of capital 
punishment. 398 F.2d at 141-44. Two decades later, Blackmun explained some of the methodological flaws 
that prompted his Maxwell ruling in a dissent that would have accepted a more sophisticated statistical 
analysis of such disparities. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 354 n.7 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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for white females. Yet this decision also seems to have gone unremarked, 
perhaps because the Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings 
on an entirely different issue.57 Whatever the explanation, no one testified 
against Blackmun, and he was confirmed unanimously. 58 
To complete the picture, we also need to consider the selection of Lewis 
Powell, who labored mightily on Haynsworth's behalf. 59 Powell probably 
never would have been nominated had Haynsworth been confirmed, whereas 
Blackmun might well have been appointed regardless of Haynsworth's fate. 
The Nixon Administration seriously considered Blackmun for the chief justice-
ship that ultimately went to his lifelong friend Warren Burger, who in turn 
strongly recommended him to Attorney General Mitchell in the wake of the 
Carswell fiasco. 60 It is therefore likely that Blackmun would have been chosen 
for an early vacancy, perhaps the one that went to Powell, if Nixon already 
had "got[ten] his southern appointment. "61 If this hypothesis is accurate, the 
relevant comparison would not be between Haynsworth and Blackmun, but 
rather between Haynsworth and Powell. 
In many respects, these two men were quite similar. Born in the same 
region about five years apart, both were leading members of the bar and pillars 
of their community, Haynsworth in South Carolina and Powell in Virginia. 
Politically, both were nominal Democrats who had supported Eisenhower.62 
From an ex ante perspective, however, Powell might have appeared a more 
threatening nominee for civil rights forces. Unlike Haynsworth, he had no 
judicial record, but the available evidence was hardly reassuring. While 
Haynsworth was "not very active" in politics,63 Powell was heavily involved 
in the organization of Dixiecrat Senator Harry Byrd, the architect of Massive 
Resistance and the dominant figure in Virginia politics for almost half a centu-
ry.64 Moreover, Powell's law firm (although not Powell himself) represented 
the Prince Edward County authorities during most of the school desegregation 
litigation, although the firm balked at crossing the line between evasion and 
defrance.65 Finally, as chairman of the Richmond school board he promoted 
57. The Court sua sponre vacated and remanded for consideration of the possibility that persons who 
had conscientious scruples against capital punishment had been excluded from the jury in violation of the 
subsequently announced rule in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), an issue that had not been 
raised in the lower courts. Maxwell, 398 U.S. at 266-67. 
58. FRANK, supra note 12, at 122, 124. 
59. See id. at 74, 76-77, 81, 91-92. 
60. /d.at117-18. 
61. /d. at 135; see supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
62. On Haynsworth, see FRANK; supra note 12, at 18. On Powell, see ELY, supra note 32, at 16. 
63. FRANK, supra note 12, at 18. 
64. ELY, supra note 32, at 16. Despite his support of Senator Byrd, Powell viewed Massive Resistance 
as "legal nonsense," although he never said so publicly. /d. at 41. 
65. The firm withdrew from the proceedings when county officials closed the public schools. John 
W. Riely, Brown v. The Board: A Very Personal Retrospective Glance, VA. LAW., Feb. 1989, at 17, 18. 
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policies designed to minimize desegregation. 66 Yet Powell faced only token 
. opposition and was confirmed almost unanimously. 67 
In short, when nominated, neither Blackmun nor Powell appeared to differ 
significantly in ideology from Haynsworth. After confirmation, both men took 
a generally conservative line. On civil rights, for example, they joined the five-
member majority in Milliken v. Bradle/8 that made cross-district or metropol-
itan relief in school desegregation cases much more difficult to justify. On 
other occasions Powell called for remedial limits in such cases.69 Powell also 
wrote, and Blackmunjoined, the five-to-four decision in San Antonio Indepen-
dent School District v. Rodriguez, 70 which rejected a claim that the Constitu-
tion afforded a fundamental right to education; this decision was widely viewed 
as discouraging many other poverty-related constitutional claims. In addition, 
Blackmun subscribed to two opinions written by Powell for the Court that 
made exclusionary zoning claims much more difficult for plaintiffs to win. 71 
Although Blackmun wrote and Powell joined the opinion in Roe v. 
Wade, 72 their overall approach to sex discrimination was quite cautious. 73 
Perhaps most notably, they refused to treat gender as a suspect classifica-
tion.74 The two also formed part of the majority in a five-to-four ruling that 
an employer's exclusion of disability benefits for pregnancy did not violate 
66. ELY, supra note 32, at 134-35. Powell sought to preserve public schools in Richmond, putting 
him at odds with the die-hard resisters. 
67. The vote in his favor was 89-1. Even the Virginia NAACP endorsed his confirmation. ABRAHAM, 
supra note 1, at 22, 313. 
68. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
69. The fullest exposition of his views came in Keyes v. School Dist. No. I, 413 U.S. 189, 236-53 
(1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Austin lndep. Sch. Dist. v: United 
States, 429 U.S. 990, 991-95 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). 
70. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
71. Village of Arlington Hts. v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (requiring 
showing of discriminatory intent to establish constitutional violation); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) 
(5-4 decision) (establishing restrictive standing rules). The Arlington Heights plaintiffs ultimately prevailed 
on their statutory claim. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Hts., 558 F.2d 1283 (7th 
Cir. 1977), cen. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978). 
72. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Roe was a 7-2 decision, and Blackmun's conservative friend Burger was 
part of the majority. At the time, abortion was hardly the ideological issue that it later became. GERALD 
N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HoPE 183-84, 258-64 (1991). 
While Blackmun remains the Court's strongest supporter of abortion rights, Powell's position was 
not as consistent as many prochoice advocates might have preferred. For example, he rejected the Reagan 
Administration's plea to overrule Roe. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 
416, 419-20 & n.1 (1983). At the same time, he consistently supported restrictions on public funding of 
abortions. See Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Poelker 
v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (per curiam); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 
438 (1977). Powell wrote the majority opinions in Maher and Beal. 
73. The characterization in the text is not intended to slight the Court's substantial advances in 
promoting gender equality during this period. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Burger Coun's Grapplings 
with Sex Discrimination, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 132 (Vincent 
Blasi ed., 1983) [hereinafter THE BURGER CoURT]. 
74. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691-92 (1973) (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and 
Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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Title VII, 75 and both strongly dissented from a decision that forbade states 
to operate all-female nursing schools.76 In the latter case, Blackmun com-
plained about the "too easy" tendency to apply "rigid rules in this area of 
claimed sex discrimination" and warned against "relegat[ing] ourselves to 
needless conformity. "77 
Their conservatism extended beyond civil rights to issues of federalism. 
Blackmun and Powell were part of the majority in National League of Cities 
v. Usery, 78 which limited federal regulation of state governmental activities. 
Powell consistently supported this approach to the Tenth Amendment, often 
in dissent. 79 In particular, he wrote the principal dissent in Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 80 which overruled National League 
in an opinion written by Blackmun. 81 
To be sure, these justices were not ideologues. 82 Of course, neither was 
75. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). Ironically, Haynsworth had been a member 
of the court of appeals majority whose decision was reversed by the Supreme Court. See infra note 89 and 
accompanying text. The court of appeals was effectively vindicated by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 
Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988)). 
76. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 733-35 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); 
id. at 735-45 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
77. ld. at 734, 735 (Biackmun, J., dissenting). 
78. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 
(1985). 
79. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 221, 265-75 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at251-65 
(Burger, C.J., joined by Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, JJ., dissenting); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 
U.S. 742, 771-75 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
80. 469 U.S. 528, 557-79 (1985) (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Rehnquist and O'Connor, JJ., 
dissenting). 
81. It is difficult to assess their approach to the issues that prompted organized labor to oppose 
Haynsworth because the Court's docket contained many fewer cases involving traditional union-management 
conflicts after 1970 than it had earlier. See Theodore J. St. Antoine. Individual Rights in rhe Work Place: 
T1ze Burger Court and Labor Law, in THE BURGER COURT, supra note 73, at 157. Blackmun and Powell 
were not especially sympathetic to union positions in those traditional cases, however. See, e.g., Hudgens 
v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (5-4 decision with Blackmun and Powell in majority and Powell filing brief 
concurrence) (holding that employees have no constitutional right to engage in peaceful primary picketing 
of retail store in shopping center); Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 
{1975) (5-4 decision, written by Powell and joined by Blackmun) (narrowly construing labor exception to 
antitrust laws). On the other hand, they sometimes supported union positions, occasionally taking opposite 
positions in the same case. See, e.g., Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 428 U.S. 397 
(1976) (5-4 decision with Blackmun in majority and Powell in dissent) {barring injunction against sympathy 
strike called in violation of no-strike clause in union contract); NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 
U.S. 272 (1972) (5-4 decision with Blackmun in majority and Powell in dissent) (limiting successor 
employer's obligations under contract negotiated by predecessor). 
Some of the Court's later cases involved conflicts between labor and civil rights interests. The most 
notable of these concerned seniority. Blackmun and Powell were in the majority when the Court ruled that 
bona fide pre-1964 seniority plans do not violate Title VII even if they perpetuate the effects of past 
discrimination. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 348-55 (1977). The Court, 
with Powell in the majority and Blackmun in dissent, later extended that holding to post-1964 seniority 
systems. American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63 (1982). The latter ruling reversed an en bane 
decision of the Fourth Circuit to which Haynsworth subscribed. Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 634 
F.2d 744 (4th Cir. 1980) (en bane). 
82. Although Blackmun is now regarded as one of the Court's last liberals, that is a comparatively 
recent development. During his first few terms, "he was largely an echo of Chief Justice Burger; references 
were commonly made to the 'Minnesota Twins.'" FRANK, supra note 12, at 131. And while Powell was 
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Haynsworth. We cannot know what Haynsworth would have done had he been 
confirmed, but his performance on the Fourth Circuit after his rejection 
provides a very tentative basis for speculation. 83 His civil rights record 
remained rather conservative, but not completely so. For example, he ruled-
that federal antidiscrimination laws did not prohibit a neighborhood swimming 
pool association from excluding African-American members and guests, a 
decision that the Supreme Court unanimously reversed in an opinion written 
by Blackmun. 84 On the other hand, he wrote an important opinion holding 
that a Reconstruction statute forbidding racial discrimination in the making and 
enforcement of contracts applied to private schools which refused to admit 
nonwhite students, a decision that was affirmed by the Supreme Court. 85 A 
few years later, he also subscribed to opinions that were favorable to a state 
university's affirmative action program. 86 His position in this regard was 
congruent with Justice PoweH'sY 
Haynsworth's views on gender-related questions were similarly mixed. For 
example, he rejected a constitutional cha11enge to a school district's rule 
requiring pregnant teachers to stop work regardless of their medical condition, 
a decision that was subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court. 88 Perhaps 
hardly a liberal, his retirement was viewed with dismay by many who appreciated his cautious approach 
to contentious questions. See ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE BaRK NOMINATION SHOOK 
AMERICA 17-20 (1989); Gerald Gunther, A Tribute co Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 101 HARV. L. REV. 
409 (1987). In other words, it is probably more accurate to characterize Blackmun and Powell as centrists 
who served as swing votes on many issues. Vincent Blasi, The Rootless Activism of the Burger Coun, in 
THE BURGER COURT, supra note 73, at 198, 210-11. 
83. At least two cautionary points should he mentioned here. First, a circuitjudge is still a lower court 
judge who is hound by precedent and subject to reversal. Cf J. Harvie Wilkinson Ill, A Tribute co Justice 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 101 HARV. L. REV. 417, 417 (1987) (reminding retired Justice Powell, who had 
asked to sit by designation on the Fourth Circuit, that "we get reversed"). Second, it may be that Hayns-
worth, like his mentor John Parker, "was a better judge after (his rejection for a seat on the Supreme Court] 
than before it." Paul A. Freund, Appoimmenr of Justices: Some Historical Perspectives, 101 HARV. L. 
REV. 1146, 1155 (1988) (quoting Justice Black). 
84. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 451 F.2d 1211 (4th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 410 U.S. 
431 (1973). 
85. McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975) (en bane), aff'd, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
Haynsworth did not rule for the plaintiffs in all particulars. He rejected their hid for attorney's fees because 
there was no express authority for such an award. McCrary, 515 F.2d at 1089-91. The Supreme Court 
affirmed that ruling. 
86. This case involved the constitutionality of university regulations requiring a form of affirmative 
action relating to the racial and gender composition of the student government and honor court. The tangled 
history of the case is summarized in the various opinions in Uzzell v. Friday, 625 F.2d 1117 (4th Cir.) 
(en bane), cen. denied, 446 U.S. 951 (1980). For present purposes, the relevant point is that Haynsworth 
consistently subscribed to opinions that would have allowed the university to justify the regulations, which 
ultimately were invalidated by the district court. See Uzzell v. Friday, 592 F. Supp. 1502 (M.D.N.C. 
1984). 
87. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
88. Cohen v. Chesterfield County Sch. Bd., 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1973) (en bane), rev'd sub nom. 
Cleveland Bd. ofEduc. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). In a later case, Haynsworth voted to strike down 
a similar maternity leave policy for public school teachers hut dissented from an order reinstating the 
plaintiffs to their positions. Paxman v. Campbell, 612 F.2d 848, 861-64 (4th Cir. 1980) (en bane) 
(Haynsworth, C.J., concurring and dissenting). 
421 
Yale Law & Policy Review Vol. 11:407, 1993 
on the basis of that reversal, Haynsworth soon afterward joined an opinion 
finding the exclusion of pregnancy from an employer's disability benefits to 
be a form of illegal sex discrimination, but that decision also was overturned 
by the Supreme Court in a decision supported by both Powell and 
Blackmun. 89 Haynsworth's position on abortion is not clear because he never 
wrote an opinion on the subject. 90 He did, however, subscribe to decisions 
that upheld abortion rights. 91 
This unsystematic overview of postnomination behavior bolsters the sense, 
suggested by his prenomination record, that Haynsworth probably would have 
compiled a moderately conservative voting record similar to that of Blackmun 
and Powell, particularly during their early years on the Court. Of course, there 
might have been differences on particular issues, but it is unlikely that Hayns-
worth would have aligned himself at the far end of the judicial spectrum. What 
would have happened later is uncertain. Blackmun's subsequent evolution 
toward liberalism could not have been confidently predicted during the confir-
mation process. Such an evolution seems implausible for Haynsworth, but 
perhaps it is less incongruous to suppose that he might have occupied the role 
of crucial swing vote that made Powell so influential. 
B. After Bark 
If the Haynsworth affair began the transition from the competence model 
to the ideological model, the Bark controversy marked its culmination. Perhaps 
the most striking feature of the Bark debate was that the opposition focused 
almost exclusively upon the nominee's judicial philosophy. Bark's critics ran 
a sophisticated-and occasionally fallacious-publicity campaign against 
89. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), rev 'd, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). See supra 
note 75 and accompanying text. 
90. Similarly, Haynsworth never wrote on the Tenth Amendment. He did, however, subscribe to two 
panel opinions that rejected National League of Cities claims. Vehicle Equip. Safety Comm'n v. National 
Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 611 F.2d 53, 54-55 (4th Cir. 1979) (upholding federal regulation requiring 
automobile manufacturers to attach a unique vehicle identification number to each passenger car); Usery 
v. Charleston County Sch. Dist., 558 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1977) (upholding application of Equal Pay Act 
to state and local governments). 
91. Northern Va. Women's Medical Ctr. v. Balch, 617 F.2d 1045 (4th Cir. 1980); Doe v. Charleston 
Area Medical Ctr., Inc., 529 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1975). Although Haynsworth never wrote an opinion on 
abortion, he apparently took a restrictive approach to sexual privacy. He rejected a married couple's 
constitutional challenge to their sodomy conviction on the ground that they had waived their right to privacy 
by allowing a third party to observe their activities. Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976) (en 
bane). A decade later, the Supreme Court, with Justice Powell writing a concurring opinion, upheld the 
constitutionality of a state sodomy law as applied to private, consensual homosexual activity. Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197-98 (1986) (Powell, 1., concurring). Powell later admitted to second thoughts 
about his vote in that case. Anand Agneshwar, Ex-Justice Says He May Have Been Wrong, NAT'L L.J., 
Nov. 5, 1990, at 3; Ruth Marcus, Powell Regrets Backing Sodomy Law, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1990, at 
A3. 
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him. 92 Still, with the possibly misleading exception of abortion, Bork's defeat 
does not appear to have had a substantial effect on the evolution of legal 
doctrine. In some respects, moreover, current law may be even less attractive 
to·those who opposed Bork than it would have been had he been confirmed. 
Judge Bork was rejected by the Senate because his views on important 
constitutional issues were regarded as extreme.93 President Reagan responded 
to Bork's defeat in much the same way that President Nixon reacted to Hayns-
worth's-by nominating someone who might have been even less palatable to 
the original nominee's opponents. Reagan's second choice was Judge Douglas 
H. Ginsburg, whom he had recently appointed to the District of Columbia 
Circuit.94 Although no one questioned his competence, Ginsburg had served 
in the Administration and enjoyed the vocal support of the officials who had 
promoted Bork; he was also twenty years Bork's junior and therefore could 
be expected to have a longer tenure than Bork.95 Dealing with Ginsburg 
turned out to be considerably easier for the opposition than counteracting 
Carswell had been. Ginsburg's candidacy lasted only a few days; he withdrew 
after revelation of his use of marijuana while a member of the Harvard law 
faculty. 96 Ultimately, Judge Anthony Kennedy of the Ninth Circuit, a less 
strident conservative, was confirmed with the endorsement of some of Bork's 
most strenuous opponents. 97 
Justice Kennedy's positions have generally been entirely congruent with 
those espoused by Bork, and, from the standpoint of Bork's opponents, in the 
field of civil rights they have been at least marginally worse. Kennedy was part 
of the majority in a series of cases decided during the Spring of 1989 that 
made civil rights claims much more difficult to prove and affirmative action 
programs much more difficult to justify. He wrote the opinion in Patterson v. 
McLean Credit Union98 which narrowly construed a Reconstruction statute 
prohibiting racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts, 
92. See BRONNER, supra note 82, at 157-60, 177-80; Suzanne Garment, The War Against Raben H. 
Bark, COMMENTARY, Jan. 1988, at 17, 19-21, 22-23, 25. 
93. Not all of the Senate opposition was ideologicaL Some was based upon political calculation. 
BRONNER, supra note 82, at 285-86, 289-92. Although some senators advanced dubious reasons for their 
negative votes, see id. at 293-95, those grounds had a distinctly secondary place in the confirmation debate. 
This was a significant departure from the structure of the arguments about Haynsworth. 
94. Douglas Ginsburg is not related to the Supreme Court's newest member, Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, although both received their undergraduate education at Cornell University and served together 
on the D.C. Circuit for seven years. Lest there be any confusion, the following discussion refers to Douglas 
Ginsburg. 
95. BRONNER, supra note 82, at 328-31. One member of the American Bar Association's Standing 
Committee on the Federal Judiciary, which screens prospective appointments, remarked: "It looks to me 
like we may be going from a Bork to a Borklet." Mary Thornton, ABA Evaluation of Ginsburg Is Not 
Expected Before Dec.], WASH. PosT, Oct. 31, 1987, at A4. 
96. BRONNER, supra note 82, at 332-35. 
97. Some concern was expressed that Judge Kennedy had a narrow and generally unsympathetic 
approach to civil rights, but the confirmation process proceeded without a hitch. /d. at 337-38. 
98. 491 u.s. 164 (1989). 
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thereby precluding claims for on-the-job harassment. Perhaps the only saving 
grace was the majority's refusal to overrule Runyon v. McCrary/9 an impor-
tant precedent which held that the statute proscribed private as well as govern-
mental discrimination, after having asked the parties to file supplemental briefs 
on that question. 100 Whether Bork would have interpreted the statute as nar-
rowly as Kennedy did is uncertain, but he is unlikely to have supported the 
attempt to repudiate Runyon because, as Solicitor General, Bork had filed an 
amicus brief urging the Court to rule as it did in that case. In City of Richmond 
v. J.A. Croson Co., 101 Kennedy stopped just short of endorsing a rule that 
would invalidate all racial preferences except those accruing to actual victims 
of discrimination. Instead, he supported a standard that would subject all such 
preferences to "the most rigorous scrutiny by the courts." 102 The following 
term, he strongly dissented from a decision upholding minority preferences in 
certain Federal Communications Commission proceedings, comparing affirma-
tive action programs to "the 'race-conscious measures'" that had been upheld 
in Plessy v. Ferguson, 103 and quoting one of the most obnoxious passages 
in the Plessy opinion in support of his view that no racial preference can be 
benign. 104 Most recently, he wrote the majority opinion holding that a signifi-
cant reduction in the power of individual county commissioners immediately 
after the election of the first African-American to win the office in decades 
did not violate the Voting Rights Act. 105 
On abortion, which occupied a central place in the Bork debate and in his 
own confirmation hearing, Kennedy also has been generally hostile to the right 
to choose. He joined the majority opinion in Webster v. Reproductive Health 
Services, 106 which significantly expanded the range of permissible abortion 
restrictions. The following year, he wrote the opinion in Ohio v. Akron Center 
for Reproductive Health, 107 which upheld a one-parent notice requirement 
for minors seeking abortions. In a case decided the same day, he expressed 
support for a two-parent notice requirement even in the absence of a judicial 
bypass procedure; a majority of the Court found the presence of this alternative 
essential to the validity of a two-parent notice requirement. 108 Kennedy also 
99. 427 u.s. 160 (1976). 
100. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617 (1988) (per curiam) (order requesting briefs 
on whether to overrule Runyon). 
101. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
102. ld. at 519 (Kennedy, 1., concurring); see also Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Lorance 
v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 
(1989). 
103. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
104. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 631, 634-36 (1990) (Kennedy, 1., dissenting). 
105. Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 820 (1992). 
106. 492 u.s. 490 (1989). 
107. 497 u.s. 502 (1990). 
108. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 480-501 (1990) (Kennedy, 1., concurring in the judgment 
in part and dissenting in part). 
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was part of the majority in Rust v. Sullivan, 109 which upheld the so-called 
"gag rule" prohibiting recipients of federal family planning funds from discuss-
ing abortion with patients. 
According to prochoice activists, however, the decision in Planned Parent-
hood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casei 10 vindicated their opposition 
to Bark's appointment. Ill Although Kennedy coauthored the plurality opinion 
that declined to overrule Roe v. Wade, 112 his position hardly represents an 
unequivocal victory for prochoice forces. 113 The plurality opinion downgrad-
ed abortion from a fundamental right114 to a liberty interest. us Moreover, 
the opinion rejected the trimester framework of Roe and adopted a deferential 
"undue burden" standard for assessing abortion regulations. 116 All but one 
of the regulations at issue were upheld under that standard, a conclusion that 
required the overruling of two recent precedents. 117 
Almost all of these cases were five-to-four decisions, and Kennedy consis-
tently took the conservative side-in some, the most conservative position. 
Except for the latest abortion ruling, perhaps the only significant subject on 
which the Court took a more liberal position than it would have had Bork been 
confirmed was flag burning. Two recent five-to-four decisions have found this 
activity to be a constitutionally protected form of political protest. Kennedy 
wrote an anguished concurrence explaining his vote to uphold the First Amend-
ment claim in Texas v. Johnson 118 and joined the majority opinion in United 
109. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991). 
110. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
Ill. For example, the head of the Women's Legal Defense Fund explained that the ruling was "a 
clear indication of how right we were to oppose Bark." AI Kamen, Cenrer-Righr Coalition Assens Itself, 
WASH. Posr, June 30, 1992, at A I, A9. 
112. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
113. Some commentators take a more optimistic view of the decision because Roe was not overruled. 
Even the optimists, however, recognize the fragility of that precedent, which survived by a 5-4 margin. 
See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, A Victory for Roe, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, !992, at A23. 
114. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53. 
115. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807, 2816. 
116. ld. at 2818-21. 
117. Id. at 2823 (overruling City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 
(1983), and Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986)). 
Caution is likewise appropriate in assessing Kennedy's opinion in Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 
(1992). That ruling upheld a challenge to officially sponsored prayers at a public school graduation 
ceremony. His position came as a surprise in light of indications in an earlier opinion that he favored 
"[s]ubstantial revision" of Establishment Clause doctrine to permit greater accommodation of religion. 
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655-56 (1989) (Kennedy, 1., concurring in the judgment 
in part and dissenting in part). Kennedy's approach in Lee is actually closer to that of the dissenters than 
to that of the other justices in the majority. Both Kennedy and the dissenters focused upon the question 
of coercion; they differed only in their assessment of the facts, with Kennedy emphasizing the inherent 
coerciveness of the prayer in that ceremonial setting. 112 S. Ct. at 2658-61. His opinion explicitly left open 
the questions he raised in County of Allegheny. Id. at 2655. Kennedy declined to join either of the two 
concurring opinions that reaffirmed the existing approach to the Establishment Clause. See Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795, 823 (1993). In short, we should not attach undue 
significance to Kennedy's apparent break with conservative constitutional doctrine in this case. 
118. 491 U.S. 397, 420-21 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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States v. Eichman. 119 Meanwhile, Bork testified in support of a constitutional 
amendment that would have overturned these rulings. 120 
To be sure, Kennedy's style has been less confrontational than Bork's. He 
has not single-mindedly pursued a right-wing agenda. 121 At the same time, 
Kennedy is one of most conservative members of a very conservative 
Court. 122 The ideological approach to confirmation focuses primarily upon 
outcomes rather than rationales. While philosophical and methodological 
differences among justices are important, such differences matter more to legal 
scholars than to political activists and the general public. A woman who finds 
it difficult to obtain an abortion will not care very much whether the legal 
obstacles she must surmount are upheld under a deferential standard of review 
or because there is no constitutional right to sexual privacy. From this stand-
point, the differences between Bork and Kennedy are much less important than 
their similarities. Indeed, from a purely pragmatic perspective, liberals might 
119. 496 U.S. 310 (1990). 
120. Hearings on Measures to Protect the Physicallntegriry of the American Flag: Hearings on S. 
1338, H.R. 2978, and S.J. Res. 180 Before the Senate Comm. on rhe Judiciary, 10Ist Cong., 1st Sess. 
99-1I4 ( I989); Starutory and ConstituTional Responses to the Supreme Coun Decision in Texas v. Johnson: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitlltional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
10Ist Cong., 1st Sess. I99-2I9 (1989); see also BoRK, supra note 49, at I27-28. 
I21. For example, Kennedy wrote a widely praised opinion that gave respectful attention to the First 
Amendment implications of a broad, proplaintiff ruling in a libel case. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 
Inc., 11I S. Ct. 24I9 (1991). He also supported a ruling that rejected a rape victim's claim for damages 
against a newspaper arising from the publication of her name. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 49I U.S. 524 (I989). 
And he dissented in a death penalty case in which the Court rejected a claim of prejudicial pretrial publicity. 
Mu'Min v. Virginia, Ill S. Ct. I899, I917-I9 (199I) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
It is entirely possible, however, that Judge Bark might have taken some of the same positions. Cf 
Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 993-1010 (D.C. Cir. I984) (Bark, J., concurring) (en bane), cen. denied, 
47I U.S. 1127 (1985) (emphasizing First Amendment considerations in support of dismissing libel suit). 
Kennedy's lack of zealotry on the Ninth Circuit was one reason that many staunch conservatives 
preferred more ideologically pure nominees such as Bark and Ginsburg. Some Justice Department officials 
regarded Kennedy as "an eighty percenter, meaning ... he could be counted on [by the Reagan Adminis-
tration] in 80 percent of the [ideologically significant] cases, but not more." BRONNER, supra note 82, at 
328-29. 
122. For example, he joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion upholding a state prohibition 
on nude dancing on the basis that prohibiting public nudity is a permissible means of protecting public order 
and morality. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 246I-62 (1991). He also joined the majority 
in a decision that overruled two recent precedents that prohibited the use of victim-impact testimony in 
capital cases. That issue had not been raised by the parties, but the Court asked for supplemental briefing 
and expedited the case. Payne v. Tennessee, Ill S. Ct. 2597 (I991). And he supported an especially 
controversial ruling that severely restricts the scope of the Free Exercise Clause in freedom of religion 
cases. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
More generally, Kennedy's overall voting patterns reflect his conservatism. He sided with Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor more than 80% of the time in each of his first four terms. He agreed with 
Justices Scalia. and White almost as often and, in any event, far more often than he did with any of the 
other more senior members of the Court. The Supreme Coun, 1990 Tenn-Leading Cases, 105 HARV. 
L. REV. 177, 420 (1991); The Supreme Coun, 1989 Term-Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L. REV. 129, 369 
(1990); The Supreme Coun, 1988 Term-Leading Cases, 103 HARV. L. REV. 137, 395 (1989); The 
Supreme Coun, 1987 Tenn-Leading Cases, 102 HARV. L. REV. 143, 351 (I988). The pattern changed 
somewhat in Kennedy's fifth term, when he voted most often with Justice Souter. Even then, he agreed 
with the four conservatives and with Justice Thomas noticeably more often than he did with the relatively 
more liberal Justices Blackmun and Stevens. The Supreme Coun, 1991 Term-Leading Cases, 106 HARV. 
L. REV. I63, 379 (1992). 
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have been better off had Bork been confirmed. Bork was older, less physically 
fit, and more abrasive than Kennedy. 123 For this reason, he probably would 
not have served as long or had as much influence as Kennedy will. In light 
of President Reagan's ideological commitments, Bark's opponents could not 
have expected a nominee who would meet their criteria; the choice was not 
between a bad candidate and a good one, but rather between a bad candidate 
and an unspecified yet certainly unattractive alternative. Compared to that 
alternative, Bork might have done less harm than his detractors feared. What-
ever the plausibility of this hypothesis-a matter about which reasonable 
persons might differ-Bark's opponents do not appear to have considered it 
very seriously before launching their attack. 
Ill. THE STAKES OF ARGUMENT AND THE PURPOSES OF OPPOSITION 
The preceding discussion suggests that defeating an objectionable nominee 
does not necessarily alter the course of jurisprudence. This conclusion does 
not mean that the ideological model is futile or that those who disagree with 
a prospective justice's views should remain silent. In a system of deliberative 
politics, citizens are entitled, perhaps even obliged, to express their opinions 
on important public questions. But the difficulty of changing the direction of 
doctrinal development through ideologically based opposition suggests that 
greater attention should be paid to what is really at stake in these situations. 
Focusing upon the stakes of argument has implications for the kinds of argu-
ments that should be made. In particular, desperate searches for any informa-
tion that might discredit a nominee ought to be avoided, if only because the 
short-term benefits are unlikely to be great, and the long-term harm to the 
political system could be significant because they can erode the sense of comity 
that is essential to political deliberation. Nevertheless, recent confirmation 
disputes have had a distinctively no-holds-barred quality. 
The Haynsworth and Bork affairs provide additional reasons to focus upon 
the stakes of argument. These episodes illustrate some inherent limitations of 
the ideological model. This approach may focus political debate upon important 
substantive questions, but those who adopt the strategy will find it difficult to 
prevail, at least in the short term. The President enjoys unique advantages in 
the confirmation process, most notably the power to select the nominee124 
and numerous informal resources that can be used to obtain support for the 
123. Indeed, some of these considerations seem to have influenced the Reagan Administration's choice 
of Scalia over Bork when Rehnquist was elevated to Chief Justice in 1986. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 
352; BRONNER, supra note 82, at 32. 
124. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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prospective justice. 125 The Senate, by contrast, lacks the institutional stomach 
for prolonged confrontation over judicial vacancies, as shown by the alacrity 
with which Blackmun and Kennedy were confirmed. A chief executive who 
really cares about the direction of the Supreme Court can usually outlast the 
opposition simply by continuing to propose philosophically compatible candi-
dates. That is precisely what Presidents Nixon and Reagan did after the Senate 
rejected their first choices. Moreover, their second choices-Carswell and 
Ginsburg-were in many respects even less attractive to the opposition than 
were the original nominees. 126 The third choices-Blackmun and Kenne-
dy-did not differ substantially from the original nominees, at least in the short 
term. 
Two qualifications are necessary. First, the replacement of Ha ynsworth 
by Blackmun does appear to have had some long-term substantive impact. 
Even if that impact could have been predicted during the confirmation process, 
the relevant comparison would then be between the southerners Haynsworth 
and Powell; their biographical and personal similarities caution against exag-
gerating the effects of Haynsworth's defeat. 
Second, as Johnson's failed nomination of Fortas to succeed Chief Justice 
Warren demonstrates, the ideological approach can succeed in making a real 
difference. No one would regard Fortas and Burger as jurisprudential clones. 
Special factors contributed to success in that instance, however. Specifically, 
President Johnson was a lame duck, the opposition sensed victory in an 
election that was less than five months away, and Warren's resignation was 
perceived as motivated by political considerations and personal animosity 
toward the likely winner. 127 
In short, the ideological approach is a very uncertain strategy. Defeating 
a philosophically obnoxious candidate is extremely difficult. Even if the effort 
succeeds, a determined chief executive might well propose another objection-
able nominee. Therefore, ideological opponents could face the arduous task 
of beating two nominees in order to obtain a more acceptable alternative. 
The uncertainty of immediate success does not necessarily justify rejection 
125. See, e.g., EDWARDS. CORWIN, THE P!l.ESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 289-90 (1940); RICHARD 
E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP 34-36, 46 { 1960); CLINTON ROSSITER, 
THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 29-30 {2d ed. 1960); DALE VINYARD, THE PRESIDENCY 97-108 (1971). 
126. Indeed, the opponents suspected that both Carswell and Ginsburg were chosen at least partially 
out of spite. FRANK, supra note 12, at 148 n.l5; BRONNER, supra note 82, at 331. 
127. Warren despised Richard Nixon, an old rival from California. When it appeared likely that Nixon 
would win the 1968 presidential election, Warren resigned in an effort to prevent him from choosing the 
next chief justice. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF 680-82 (1983); G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN 
306-07, 309 (1982), Warren's revulsion stemmed from Nixon's efforts to obtain support for Dwight 
Eisenhower in the California delegation to the 1952 Republican National Convention. Those efforts undercut 
Warren's hopes of emerging as a compromise candidate in the event of a convention deadlock. ld. at 139-
43; SCHWARTZ, supra, at 23. For further discussion of Warren's antipathy toward Nixon, see id. at 171, 
283-84, 336-37, 399-400. The transparency of Warren's motivation fueled Senate opposition to the Fortas 
nomination. WHITE, supra, at 307-09. 
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of the ideological model. That approach can promote a more deliberative 
politics even if the opponents fail to defeat a particular nominee. 128 Those 
who oppose a prospective justice on ideological grounds need not prevail in 
order to conclude that their efforts furthered other valuable goals, such as 
public education or political mobilization. Unfortunately, actual experience 
suggests that the ideological model has not clearly elevated the level of political 
dialogue in this field. 
For example, ideologically based opposition to an objectionable nominee 
may encourage the selection of more moderate candidates in the future. But 
the President might also respond by selecting persons with very pronounced 
views as long as the likelihood of confirmation is sufficiently high. Alternative-
ly, the chief executive might resort to obscure candidates with no track record 
on controversial matters, or to politically clever choices whose attitudes are 
better known but who are difficult to defeat in a confirmation vote. The first 
presidential response might help to focus public debate, but our recent experi-
ence suggests that such debate will be more confrontational than deliberative. 
The alternative responses are as likely to obscure as to illuminate public 
discourse. 
The scenarios outlined in the previous paragraph are not entirely hypotheti-
cal. President Nixon chose the first course in reaction to the Haynsworth 
affair. His next choice, nominated concurrently with Powell, was William 
Rehnquist, a strong conservative whose views were regarded as so extreme 
that the American Civil Liberties Union opposed his confirmation, marking 
the first time that the organization had ever taken a position about a nominee 
or candidate for any public office. 129 President Bush adopted the other two 
strategies in the aftermath of the Bork controversy. His first appointment was 
the almost unknown David Souter, 130 his second the very conservative Clar-
128. The unlikelihood of ultimate success does not necessarily imply that the ideological model is 
illegitimate or unfaithful to the constitutional scheme. Thoughtful commentators who originally supported 
the competence model have, upon further reflection, concluded that the Senate is entitled to exercise its 
own judgment about Supreme Court nominees. E.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, The COJifirmation Process: 
Law or Politics?, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1202, 1206-08 (1988). 
129. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 22, 318-22; SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBER-
TIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU 366-67 (1990). 
130. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 366-67. The choice of the almost unknown Souter, who was widely 
suspected of being a closet extremist, rather than a moderate, raises questions about the idea promoted by 
some commentators that the ideological approach can produce greater interbranch cooperation in the longer 
run. E.g., Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1514-15. Underlying this suggestion is the game theorists' 
notion that cooperation can emerge from a "tit-for-tat" strategy in which adversaries respond reciprocally 
to each other. See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984). 
The ideological significance of Souter's appointment is difficult to assess. While Souter joined Kennedy 
as coauthor of the Casey plurality opinion and has taken some other positions reflecting a less than zealous 
adherence to New Right principles, his overall record has been quite conservative. During his first two 
years on the Court, he has voted with the more liberal justices (Blackrnun and Stevens, and-during his 
first year-Marshall) considerably less often than he has sided with others. The Supreme Coun, 1991 
Tenn-Leading Cases, supra note 122, at 379; The Supreme Coun, 1990 Term-Leading Cases, supra 
note 122, at 420. 
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ence Thomas, a clever choice because many who disagreed with his views 
found it difficult to oppose the confirmation of an African-American. 131 
Another function served by ideological opposition is that of political 
mobilization. For example, the debate over the Thomas nomination galvanized 
large numbers of women into unprecedented electoral activity in 1992; many 
who had not participated in politics before did so for the first time, and many 
others who had previously worked in politics did so to a greater extent than 
before. 132 Clarence Thomas's confirmation became an important issue in the 
reelection campaigns of several senators who voted for him. Alan Dixon, an 
Illinois Democrat who had never lost an election in a political career spanning 
more than four decades, was defeated for renomination by Carol Moseley-
Braun, an African-American female candidate who emphasized the incumbent's 
support of the new Justice and went on to become the first African-American 
woman ever to serve in the Senate. 133 Similarly, Arlen Specter, a Pennsyl-
vania Republican, faced a strong challenge from Lynn Yeakel, a political 
novice who based her campaign largely upon Specter's role in aggressively 
attacking Anita Hill, Thomas's principal antagonist during the confirmation 
hearings. 134 Overall, an unprecedented number of women ran for the Senate, 
and an unprecedented number won seats in 1992, largely in reaction to the 
Senate's handling of the Thomas nomination. 135 To the extent that the 
Thomas nomination was a campaign issue, however, the electoral debate 
typically related to sexual harassment and Hill's credibility. 136 Less clear is 
the extent to which these campaigns represented meaningful discussions of 
more general legal and constitutional questions that were the foundation of the 
ideological opposition to Thomas. 
Finally, ideological opposition can serve as a tool for longer-term public 
education about the legal system, the structure of government, the meaning 
of rights, and the role of the Supreme Court. The degree to which any of these 
functions was served by the debates over Bork and Thomas is ambiguous. The 
low level of those debates raised concerns that the judicial selection process 
131. TIMOTHY M. PHELPS & HELEN WINTERNITZ, CAPITOL GAMES 73-78 (1992). During his first 
year on the bench, Justice Thomas voted substantially more often with the most conservative members, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, than with anyone else. The Supreme Court, 1991 Tenn-Leading 
Cases, supra note 122, at 379. 
132. See, e.g., PHELPS & WINTERNITZ, supra note 131, at 426-27. 
133. MICHAEL BARONE & GRANT UJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1992 352 (1991) 
(on Dixon's career). Bob Benenson, Incumbent Tremors in Illinois: Democrat Dixon Dumped, 50 CONG. 
Q. WKLY. REP. 739, 739-40 (1992) (on Moseley-Braun's election). 
134. Beth Donovan, Women's Campaigns Fueled Mostly by Women's Checks, 50 CoNG .. Q. WKLY. 
REP. 3269, 3269-70 (1992). 
135. Jeffrey L. Katz & Ceci Connolly, Women, Minorities Rock Records, But Ideology Will Barely 
Budge, 50 CoNG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3557, 3559, 3561-62 (1992). 
136. See DAVID BROCK, THE REAL ANITA HILL 9-11 (1993); PHELPS & WINTERNITZ, supra note 
131, at 425-57; see also supra note 5 (collecting representative commentaries on Hill's charges during 
Thomas confirmation hearings). 
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had become excessively politicized, the distinctive positiOn of the Court 
undermined, and the public so disenchanted with politics that urgent reforms 
were needed. 137 Perhaps the pendulum has begun to swing in a new direction 
with the nomination of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Those who strongly 
disagreed with her views treated her with respect, even as they made clear the 
extent of their differences. Not even her onetime leadership role in the Ameri-
can Ciyil Liberties Union caused difficulty. 138 Her treatment sharply contrast-
ed with the vilification heaped upon presidential candidate Michael Dukakis 
in 1988 for his mere membership in the organization. 139 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It bears emphasizing that this discussion does not address the legitimacy 
of either the competence model or the ideological model. Rather, its central 
inquiry is the extent to which the transition from the former to the latter has 
promoted more meaningful political discourse in the confirmation process. That 
the answer is ambiguous should lead us to ponder the broader implications of 
our recent experience. 
General dissatisfaction with the Bork and Thomas proceedings suggests that 
the ideological approach has not encouraged the appropriate level of political 
deliberation about the Supreme Court or the Constitution. We should not have 
unrealistic standards, however. We live in a nation committed to "uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open" discussion of public issues. 140 Although many argu-
ments made in the course of such discussion will appeal to our rational facul-
ties, others necessarily will have emotional and symbolic significance. 141 Mr. 
Dooley's famous observation that "[p]olitics ain't bean bag" 142 ought to 
caution us against expecting all political discourse to attain the level of the 
137. See supra note 5 (collecting representative commentary). 
138. See WALKER, supra note 129, at 304-05. 
139. See id. at 368-70. To be sure, Dukakis was running for elective office whereas Ginsburg was 
nominated for an appointive one. Even if that distinction matters-why it should is uncertain, especially 
when the appointive position carries life tenure-it cannot fully explain the absence of controversy about 
Ginsburg's active role in the ACLU. Morton Halperin, President Clinton's nominee for the new position 
of assistant secretary of defense for democracy and peacekeeping, has become the target of ideological 
attacks based in part upon his leadership positions in the ACLU. Eric Schmitt, Ideological Clash Over a 
Pentagon Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1993, at 1. 
140. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
141. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1971); cf George E. Marcus & Michael 
B. MacKuen, Anxiety, Enthusiasm, and the Vote: The Emotional Underpinnings of Learning and Involve-
ment During Presidential Campaigns, 87 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 672 (1993) (arguing that people use emotions 
as tools for efficient information processing and thus emotionality enhances their abilities to engage in 
meaningful political deliberation); see also MURRAY EDELMAN .. THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS (1964). 
142. Like many familiar maxims, this one is usually quoted out of context. The full text is: "'Politics,' 
[Mr. Dooley] says, 'ain't bean bag. 'Tis a man's game; an' women, childher, an' prohybitionists'd do well 
to keep out iv it.'" FINLEY P. DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY: IN PEACE AND IN WAR xiii (1898). 
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Lincoln-Douglas debates. Nevertheless, the quality of the confirmation argu-
ments has been extremely disturbing. Many have been vituperative, extreme, 
or misleading, creating political polarization and civic alienation. Too often 
the participants have seemed more interested in winning a short-term political 
battle than in facilitating deliberative politics or effective government. Unfortu-
nately, the same can be said about many other aspects of contemporary 
political discourse. 143 
Deliberative politics and effective government ultimately require a degree 
of comity that is inconsistent with slash-and-burn rhetoric. Our system rests 
upon many unexpressed understandings and an uncodified, but shared, sense 
of limits. These understandings and limits help us avoid open warfare over 
every dispute. They reflect an appreciation of life's uncertainties, a faith that 
today's losers can be tomorrow's winners, and that those who are in opposition 
now will eventually have to govern. In an important sense, the confirmation 
battles analyzed in this article remind us of the abiding significance of these 
lessons. If we learn these lessons well, we might experience more meaningful 
politics and achieve greater public faith in government. 
143. See--DIONNE, supra note 10, at 15-17 (discussing how 30-second campaign spots focus on 
character assassination or divisive social issues, rather than positive information about candidates or causes); 
JAMIESON, supra note 9, at 50-60, 84-100 (discussing the use of television and of veiled attacks-harnessing 
private prejudices which are publicly denied-to wage attack campaigns); MICHAEL PFAU & HENRY C. 
KENSKI, ATTACK POLITICS 13-60 (discussing attack politics in the Reagan era and the 1988 elections) 
(1990). 
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